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The Problem of Protection: Rethinking Rhetoric of 
Normalizing Surgeries
Amy Falvey, Augustana College
Abstract: This essay focuses on the rhetoric of protection that emerges around infants who face the 
prospect of normalizing surgeries. Frequently, decisions to proceed with normalizing surgeries are made 
by doctors and parents with “protection” of the infant as a motivating force. “Protection,” in such contexts, 
typically refers to protection of the infant from the inhospitable world that lies in wait for an individual 
whose body does not conform to social, morphological, and biological norms. While this concern may be 
valid and important, this essay argues that there are alternative narratives or notions of protection that 
must also be acknowledged and validated.
Keywords: protection, safety, intersex, disability, normativity, gender, legibility
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It is strange that her desire to protect me from harm had the unintentional consequence … of actually causing 
me harm.
—Cassandra Aspinall, “Do I Make You Uncomfortable?”
[B]odily-being is shaped not only by the surgeon’s knife but also by the discourses that justify and contest the 
use of such instruments.
—Nikki Sullivan, “The Somatechnics of Intersexuality”
I question some of the assumptions leading well-intentioned people to believe that surgery for children with 
atypical bodies is a good solution to the difficulties children may face because of their atypicality. 
—Adrienne Asch, “Disability, Bioethics, and Human Rights”
It is significant that today the lives of conjoined twins are considered tragic if the operation to separate them is 
not feasible. This does not always accord with the feelings of the conjoined twins themselves.
—Elizabeth Grosz, “Intolerable Ambiguity”
When Cassandra Aspinall, herself born with a cleft palate, gave birth to her third son—who, like Cassandra, 
was born with a cleft palate—the issues she struggled with as both a child and an adult reemerged in new, 
extremely complicated ways. In her own life, Cassandra’s parents had decided that she undergo surgery at a 
young age. Cassandra continued surgeries into her seventeenth year, and then chose against later procedures 
that would have made scarring much less evident. Aspinall recounts her own experience as a constant 
challenge to negotiate between what others thought about her and her appearance, and her own perceptions 
of herself. She does not share her story in order to warn against early appearance-normalizing surgery; 
instead, she urges parents to consider the motivations behind early surgical change:  “Acknowledging the 
incredible complexity of relationships, the intensity of social pressures, and how difficult it is for children 
to express their opinions means that time must be taken to do the right thing. The possibility of coercion 
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cannot be ignored” (Aspinall 2006, 27).1 Like almost all other narratives about early surgery, Aspinall’s 
story evokes the term around which so many questions revolve: protection. Similarly, Aspinall directly 
addresses the prospect of coercion that—whether implicitly or explicitly—underlies the complexities of 
decision making in regard to early appearance-normalizing surgeries.
As feminist and gender studies, medical studies, and disability studies have all grown more aware of 
the complicated questions of surgeries aimed at normalizing the appearance of infants born with physical 
anomalies and/or genitalia considered ambiguous, so too has the problem of what exactly constitutes 
protection been more frequently called into question. Much of the research clearly reveals that protection 
and coercion are terms that require significant dissection and are of the greatest significance when one is 
born “abnormal.” As Aspinall points out, “I acknowledge that there will be (and have been) instances where 
my interpretation is the one that matters and leads me to step in to protect my children, even though they 
would prefer that I didn’t. But it is important to remember that there are many ways to interpret the same 
set of circumstances. Your version may not be the most important one worth acting on” (Aspinall 2006, 
27). Although many stories that express such complexities and ambivalence—told by parents and children 
in response to personal experience with appearance-normalizing surgeries—have surfaced, the dominant 
understanding of “protection” in such circumstances has remained the same.
Aspinall points out that the possibility of coercion cannot be ignored. In this essay I contend that it is 
this very possibility that often goes unacknowledged, or is erased, through the rhetorical creation of doctors 
and parents that are saving one from an impending and inevitable life of tragedy. Although normalizing 
surgeries tend to be chosen for the sake of the child’s protection, the meaning of protection in this context 
is predominantly understood as protection from a social world that is hostile towards physical difference. 
While this understanding of protection certainly warrants consideration in making a decision about 
surgical intervention, its dominance also elides other narratives of what protection might constitute in such 
circumstances. Thus, this essay works not to disavow the protection that is understood as an effort to keep 
a child safe from the inhospitable social environments the child would surely encounter; rather, it proposes 
that we heed the multifarious voices that pose a challenge to thinking of protection as only protection of the 
child from the social world. Utilizing both a fictional narrative—the 2007 film XXY—and the nonfictional 
stories of parents and children who have been directly involved in early normalizing surgeries, this essay 
seeks to present alternative narratives of protection. 
Often the dominant narrative of protection is affirmed through the rhetorical creation of a savior. 
Again, I do not wish to suggest that a child whose bodily contours do not fit social norms of morphology 
or biological sex faces no threat in society. However, this threat often becomes emphasized to the point 
at which the life of an individual (the infant or child) is prematurely and authoritatively pronounced to 
be inescapably tragic. The centralization of this “tragic” figure, then, rhetorically generates a savior out of 
those who work to alleviate the tragedy. When this centralization occurs, it is often precisely the possibility 
of coercion that can be left ignored. I propose that the multiplication of other, non-dominant, narratives of 
protection might be heard, in order to transform the discourses in which anomalous bodies are understood 
and approached not only by the medical industry and parents, but in the public imagination. I also suggest 
here that in affirming other definitions of “protection,” we might consider as well that norms themselves are 
being protected from the threat to social order and coherency posed by the persistence of ambiguity and/
or anomaly.  
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“Show Them … Mercy”: The Making of Saviors and Tragic Bodies
Olympia, the albino, hunchbacked, and bald narrator of Katherine Dunn’s Geek Love, the 1983 novel about 
a carnival couple who breed their own freak show, does not view her life of “deformity” as the tragedy that 
most of the world sees in or on her body. As an adult, accompanied by her friend Miss Lick, she narrates the 
feeling of eyes upon her at the swimming pool. The passage is worth quoting at length, as it exemplifies both 
the discourses of “tragedy” and the role of the “savior” in dominant narratives of protection:
With my eyes closed I can feel the children looking at me. They have stopped their games for a moment in the 
shallow end where they can watch me. I too am at the shallow end, sitting on the steps in water up to my nipples. 
Miss Lick is plowing up and down the pool in her ponderous and dutiful laps. The children’s eyes are crawling 
on me. If I opened my eyes they would smile at me and wave. They are just old enough to be embarrassed at 
their normality in front of me.  
Because I am Olympia Binewski and am accustomed to the feel of eyes moving on me, I turn slightly on my 
submerged seat and reach down as though examining my toes under water. This angle will allow the children a 
clear profile view of my hump….
But Miss Lick is standing in the shallow end, glowering down at the children. I can hear her harshness. “Are 
you swimming laps or fooling around?” And four little creatures do not speak but kick off from the wall and 
chase each other down the far lane of the pool to escape.
The light is pale green and moves on Miss Lick’s enormous shoulders and chest.  She turns and nods at me—a 
quick twitch of tension at her mouth that stands for a smile.  She is telling me that she has saved me from the 
stares of idiots and that I am safe with her to guard me. (Dunn 1989, 325-26)   
Although Olympia realizes that these childrens’ eyes are upon her body, she does not express shame. 
Rather, she angles her body so that the children may see it more fully; aware of their gaze, she chooses how 
to be seen. Olympia does not feel that her body is a tragedy, but Miss Lick demands that Olympia’s body 
signify this tragedy in her adopting the role of savior. She silences the desire of Olympia—who shifts her 
body to be seen more fully—in that her response deems this desire impossible. When Olympia acknowledges 
that Miss Lick is playing the role of savior, it becomes clear that Miss Lick both misunderstands and 
misinterprets how Olympia feels about her body (that it is not a tragedy) or what Olympia desires, which 
is “abnormal.” It is both the tragedy and the savior in this excerpt that become very useful to interrogate. 
Miss Lick exercises a choice in the name of saving Olympia from her own tragic body, but Olympia neither 
considers her body tragic nor believes she needs saving. There is a violence exerted in this silencing and 
“saving.” Although fictional, this instance serves as a reminder that we must be cautious in assuming that 
one desires protection from abnormality itself. It warns against the possibly erroneous and paternalistic 
assumption that life in an anomalous body is inevitably undesirable and tragic.
Because of the discourses of tragedy that so vehemently persist around the subjects of both disability 
and infants born intersexed, and because these two subjects deal directly with dominant conceptions of 
wholeness and normality in relationship to morphology, this essay approaches these “abnormal” bodies 
in conjunction with one another.2 This is not to conflate “deformities” and intersexed bodies, but rather 
to address the similar ways in which these bodies are constructed and represented through dominant 
ideological rhetoric. As Nikki Sullivan states, “We are surrounded by, and have embodied, the idea that 
while the vast majority of bodies may not be ill, they are nevertheless ‘wrong’ in one way or another: they 
have too few (or too many) limbs or digits; they (or parts of them) are the wrong size, the wrong age, the 
wrong color; they are ‘sexually ambiguous’” (Sullivan 2009, 313). Surgical interventions in infants, Sullivan 
contends, are implemented to “restore order” to bodies. Both intersexed infants and those born with other 
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physical anomalies are predominantly viewed as wrong and in instant, urgent need of correction by medical 
doctors and surgeons.
Anne Fausto-Sterling suggests that few “ambiguous” infants would make it into adulthood in “sexually 
diverse form.” She argues that, while the medical industry seeks to make legible sexes, the decision for 
surgery from parents or guardians is often made out of a “genuinely humanitarian concern”:
Almost at once such infants are entered into a program of hormonal and surgical management so that they can 
slip quietly into society as “normal” heterosexual males or females. I emphasize that the motive is in no way 
conspiratorial. The aims of the policy are genuinely humanitarian, reflecting the wish that people be able to “fit 
in” both physically and psychologically. (Fausto-Sterling 1993, 22; emphasis mine)
Through the rhetoric of tragedy—concerns about locker rooms and men’s or women’s restrooms, 
distrust of the terrible and terrifying world of judges that await in classrooms—the choice for early surgery 
is often made through the rhetoric of saving, or protecting. Saviors are created rhetorically, in the name of 
giving a good life or saving a body from the possibility of a life of shunning and teasing, or, further, saving 
one from the impossibility of a “productive” and “normal” life. And while these aims may be “genuinely 
humanitarian,” demonstrating a desire for a “good” and “normal” life, they also potentially elide what some 
(including many who underwent surgery as an infant in the past) might call acts of coercion or violence upon 
an uninformed and unconsenting person. Such rhetoric also might foster “protection” of an inhospitable 
world for atypical bodies. Continuing to assert that humanitarianism lies in the child’s transformation, 
rather than the transformation of social norms and the social world, elides the humanity of the child whose 
life and body are at stake—and may also erase the possibility of coercion or violation that troubles that 
humanitarian motive. 
Disability studies theorist Adrienne Asch calls attention to the means by which bodies born with physical 
impairments are often construed as being unfortunate, in need of pity. Asch critiques this assumption and 
argues for a cessation of marking disabled infants as defective—to cease seeing these bodies as less than 
human and assuming that a life in such a body is a tragedy.  Asch notes that there is a “gap in understanding 
that persists between people with and without disabilities regarding the potential for life with disability 
to be acceptable, rewarding, or as rewarding as the lives of people who do not report impairments” (Asch 
2001, 301). This gap persists, Asch suggests, in that people who report impairments do not consider their 
lives defective, less whole, less fulfilling, while the dominant notion about impairments is precisely that they 
always already inscribe an “unremitting tragedy” (300):
When people with disabilities report unhappiness or dissatisfaction (a minority in every study), the sources 
resemble sources of unhappiness in the lives of nondisabled people—inadequacies in financial security, work, or 
social and personal relationships … sometimes impairment-related factors, such as pain and fatigue, contribute 
to unsatisfying relationships or to the difficulty of holding a job, but the frustrations come from difficulty in 
incorporating the impairment into existing interpersonal and institutional life. (Asch 2001, 301)
Asch reiterates that life with disability is not the tragedy that dominant ideologies and medical institutions 
claim it to be. And when one does “report” feelings of unhappiness with one’s life, they are either similar to 
those unhappinesses which are reported by those who do not possess physical impairments, or otherwise 
suggest a discontent that pertains not to their own biology or morphology but to the shapes of society and 
institutions that do not accommodate the contours of that body. This is similar to the “tragedy” continually 
assumed on the body of an intersexed infant.3  
Martin S. Pernick describes the debates that waged in the US following the public disclosure of Dr. Harry 
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J. Haiselden’s decision, in 1915, to let “Baby Bollinger” die because of the infant’s multiple impairments. 
Pernick suggests that “Haiselden’s crusade did not combine logically incompatible goals, but it did appeal 
to fundamentally irreconcilable emotions: His supporters were motivated by a jarring combination of 
compassion and hatred” (Pernick 1996, 94). The language of love and compassion came to permeate the 
discourses that surrounded the deaths of what Pernick refers to as “defectives,” a term that worked in 
conjunction with the discourses of eugenics he both exposes and critiques.4 Argumentative constructions—
which still permeate how bodies are imagined (as whole and integrated) and how discourses frame those 
bodies—relied on the rhetorical eclipse and erasure of even the possibility of coercion or violation through 
the language of compassion and mercy, through the alleviation of a tragedy:
Without a word of transition, Helen Keller [who lived a life with impairments until the age of 88] described the 
Bollinger baby as “the hopeless being spared from a life of misery. No one cares about that pitiful, useless lump 
of flesh.” Clarence Darrow’s comments revealingly captured the full ambiguity of this appeal. “Chloroform unfit 
children. Show them the same mercy that is shown beasts that are no longer fit to live.” (Pernick 1996, 96)
In Helen Keller’s first sentence, the letting die of an impaired infant is an act of mercy, the act of a savior, 
protecting the infant from a tragic life in a tragic body and from the path of persecution that lies in wait. 
Her second sentence contradicts the first and explicitly articulates the eclipse that occurs in the creation 
of a savior in this rhetorical construction. The first sentence presumes a position of caretaker, relieving 
the infant of the “life of misery” out of love or compassion. The second sentence contradicts that claim 
to protection, in that it states outright that “no one cares.” In calling the infant’s body a “useless lump of 
flesh,” Keller suggests that this body is a failure, a failure to fall into the norms of permissible bodily shapes. 
The body fails to meet normative (which here means explicitly able-bodied) molds in its designation as 
a “lump”: it does not map, conform, and take shape within normative constructions of what bodies are, 
should be, or can possibly be. Thus it also fails to fulfill its capacity as a productive body in the capitalist 
system that devalues the body it cannot utilize for its own ends—it becomes “useless.”5  What constitutes 
a “useful” life is shaped by the economic, social, and normative mappings of how bodies, and lives, should 
be shaped, and how bodies can be made useful or lead “fulfilling” lives. Clarence Darrow’s command to 
chloroform unfit children, in order to show them mercy, proclaims that a life in “unfit” embodiment is less 
preferable (or merciful) than death itself. While the social pressures that surround atypical bodies cannot 
be dismissed or minimized, this presumes not only that life cannot be—in the words of Judith Butler—an 
“occasion for flourishing” but that it can be none other than wholly tragic. As Butler writes,
Resistance to coercive surgery moreover calls for an understanding that infants with intersexed conditions are 
part of the continuum of human morphology and ought to be treated with the presumption that their lives are 
and will be not only livable, but also occasions for flourishing. The norms that govern idealized human anatomy 
thus work to produce a differential sense of who is human and who is not, which lives are livable, and which are 
not. This differential works for a wide range of disabilities as well. (Butler 2004, 4)
As I have argued, “saving” the infant from a socially unlivable life rhetorically becomes an act of 
compassion, and the space for considering the possibility, the potential for coercion or violation seems 
to vanish. Butler argues that infants with anomalous or atypical bodies should not be treated as tragic—as 
persons whose lives will be inevitably so. Rather, such lives should be approached not just as survivable, 
but as “occasions for flourishing.” What would it mean to treat these lives in such a manner? How might the 
term “protection” be differently approached or understood if one were to affirm the livability and possibility 
of one’s life, rather than to foreclose that opportunity by preemptively deciding it must be tragic?
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“Occasions for Flourishing”: Narratives of Protection and XXY
Fausto-Sterling asks her readers to consider “the psychological consequences of … raising children as 
unabashed intersexuals,” while noting that “on the surface that track seems fraught with peril” (Fausto-
Sterling 1993, 24). She suggests that such a track encompasses encounters with many normatively charted 
spaces of bathrooms and schoolyards and entails entering a society that awaits without a provision of 
welcoming or habitable spaces. Yet what would be the consequences of embracing this perilous track? 
According to Sara Ahmed, “we walk on the path as it is before us, but it is only before us as an effect of 
being walked upon. A paradox of the footprint emerges. Lines are both created by being followed and are 
followed by being created. The lines that direct us, as lines of thought as well as lines of motion, are in this 
way performative” (Ahmed 2006, 16). As she suggests, norms are reiterated and perform certain lines of 
life, of ideology, and of embodiment. To embrace the dangerous path of “raising children as unabashed 
intersexuals,” then, would mean to make new lines, new tracks that could be followed; it would mean to 
make more habitable spaces. As Ahmed states, “Deviation leaves its own marks on the ground, which can 
even help generate alternative lines, which cross the ground in unexpected ways. Such lines are indeed 
traces of desire; where people have taken different routes to get to this point or that point” (20). Released 
in 2007, XXY is an Argentine film that, I would argue, presents such alternative routes or lines, along with 
alternative notions of protection.6 In so doing, the narrative also refuses to make its main character, Alex, 
into a figure of tragedy in need of saving.  
XXY is set in the aftermath of a family’s departure from Buenos Aires to a secluded house on the shores 
of Uruguay. The family—comprised of father Kraken (Ricardo Darín), mother Suli (Valeria Bertuccelli), and 
their child Alex (Inés Efron)—has been mostly isolated from urban contact or community; Kraken works 
as a biologist on the Uruguayan shore. Despite the seclusion of the family, the film opens with the arrival 
of visitors, and we soon know the reason for their arrival. The family that stays with Kraken, Suli, and Alex 
is also comprised of three: father Ramiro (Germán Palacios), mother Erika (Carolina Peleritti), and their 
son Álvaro (Martín Piroyansky). It is quickly revealed that Ramiro’s profession has to do with his visit; 
Ramiro, a plastic surgeon, has come to stay with the family by request of Alex’s mother. Suli is interested 
in his services because Alex, who is fifteen years old, was born intersexed, and Suli believes it in the best 
interest of her child to have surgery performed to mold Alex into a woman. Suli has grown increasingly 
concerned because Alex has stopped taking hir hormone pills.7 Alex’s case and the story we follow in XXY 
are not unique because cases of intersexed infants are all that rare, but for the reason suggested by the 
film’s director Lucía Puenzo:  “In Argentina and Italy, and other countries where the film has already been 
released, it created a debate on what seems almost impossible in our societies: an intersex body that has not 
been mutilated, and not only survives but demands the opportunity to be desired” (Tehrani 2008). What we 
are presented with in XXY is, instead of a narrative of tragedy or a narrative of normative desires, a story of 
a livable life, and an “occasion for flourishing.”
But Alex is not without hir enemies. Not even in the quite rural community where Alex lives is ze exempt 
from a very real threat of violence and persecution. After ze reveals the secret of hir “ambiguous” genitalia 
to hir best male friend Vando (Luciano Nobile), he shares this information with three other male classmates 
at school. In the latter half of the film, the results of this “betrayal” (as Alex calls it) come to fruition when 
the three schoolmates Vando has informed assault Alex, pulling down hir pants and demanding to see hir 
genitalia. Though Alex is not raped, the violent attack on hir body bespeaks of the endangerment of those 
who do not conform to the constructed binary of male or female.
The varying responses to Alex’s body conveyed by the characters in XXY reveal differing and shifting 
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understandings of “protection” and “safety.” Alex’s mother Suli, for example, initially is the force seeking 
out Ramiro—and plastic surgery—for her child’s well-being. Yet Suli’s role gradually shifts over the course 
of the film. At the beginning, she articulates the “generally humanitarian” concerns that a parent might 
have for a child facing an antagonistic social world. She desires the good and normal life for Alex. At this 
juncture, Suli sees the problem as, and in, Alex’s body, rather than the social spaces in which hir body exists. 
She expresses growing concern over Alex’s recent refusal to continue taking hormones and worries that “her 
body will change … she will stop developing as a woman.”8 Suli expresses a fear of Alex’s being infringed 
upon by “the other” that threatens to overtake hir body. The transitional moment for Suli’s character takes 
place after the attack on Alex by the aforementioned three schoolboys. In response to this attack, it is 
implicit that Suli begins to understand that the problem is not in Alex’s body but in the social body. Rather 
than suggesting that an attack of this nature warrants or justifies the surgery she initially desires for Alex, 
she lies curled in bed next to Alex and Alex’s female friend. The visitors’ stay following the attack is not 
lengthy, and Suli does not again articulate a desire for her teenage child either to have surgery or to continue 
taking hormones.
While Suli’s conflicted and shifting responses to Alex suggest a notion of safety and protection that is 
undergoing revision, the somewhat juxtaposed figures of Kraken and Ramiro also reflect conflicting (and 
for Kraken, developing) notions of protection. Ramiro, the plastic surgeon, is constructed somewhat 
antithetically to Kraken, Alex’s father. This is emphasized in the moment when the two families (all except 
Alex) convene around the dinner table and, after Ramiro attempts to force his son to drink wine, Kraken 
states, “I can’t stand bullying.” Ramiro’s dominant and coercive stance is aligned in relative opposition to 
Kraken’s defense of the “bullied.” While Ramiro believes Alex has a condition that needs fixing, Kraken 
believes that Alex was “perfect” from the moment of hir birth. In articulating this, a very different narrative 
of wholeness or integrity emerges. Rather than desiring Alex’s body to conform to dominant fictions of 
wholeness, or reading hir body as a tragedy, Kraken immediately (and continually) believes hir to be 
“perfect” —an “occasion for flourishing.” Since Alex has been treated for the past fifteen years as a female, 
the contrast between Ramiro and Kraken may initially seem to be the result of Kraken’s view of Alex as 
a daughter in need of fatherly protection. Yet, Kraken refers to Alex as both his daughter and his son 
throughout the course of the film, suggesting that he does not see Alex as “female.”  
In conversation with Álvaro, Alex refers to Ramiro’s occupation of cosmetic surgeon as that of a “butcher.” 
Defending his father’s line of work, Álvaro contends that he “doesn’t butcher people. He fixes them.” 
According to Álvaro, Ramiro works mostly on the correction of what Álvaro refers to as “deformities,” 
and this concentration suggests the pertinence of his expertise to Alex’s  presumed “deformity” that needs 
proper “fixing.” While Alex alludes to the possible violence involved in the cutting of the body to alleviate 
“deformity,” Álvaro elides the prospect of “butchery” by creating a savior who both heals and fixes the 
supposedly sick. Ramiro’s occupation, which involves the “fixing” of the “wrong” body, also overlaps with 
his desire to form his son Álvaro into a “proper” heterosexual man.
The consistently evident concern over the masculinity and heterosexuality of the surgeon’s son emerges 
specifically in a moment towards the close of the film, as Ramiro and Álvaro sit beside one another after 
dark at the beach. After admitting to his son that he doesn’t particularly like him or believe that Álvaro will 
have his father’s “talent” (Álvaro’s artistic drawings are diminished and feminized by Ramiro earlier in the 
film), Ramiro discovers that Álvaro has feelings for Alex: “Finally, good news,” he says in response to this 
revelation, “I was afraid you were a fag.”       
While Ramiro’s character does not explicitly convey the “humanitarian” concerns that have been 
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addressed in this essay, the language that converges around both his occupation and his relationship with 
his son suggests that Ramiro does believe that his surgical work and his anxiety over his son’s masculinity 
and heterosexuality are both driven by “humanitarian” instincts. Ramiro presumes that someone who does 
not fit morphological or sexual norms is less capable of operating in the social world—and accordingly, it 
is individual bodily or sexual shapes that must be altered. Ramiro never expresses concerns over the social 
environment that deems these shapes the only possible or permissible ones, but rather seems to simply 
accept the very strictly demarcating lines that separate biological sex and sexuality itself.  
When Ramiro finds out, for example, that his son has feelings for Alex, he is contented to know that 
his son is not the “fag” he worried he might be. In Ramiro’s mind, then, Alex (quite simply) is a female 
whose present illegibility simply needs the restorative powers offered by the medical industry (which heals 
by purportedly making that unreadability readable). There is nothing queer (to Ramiro) about Álvaro’s 
desire for Alex, and nothing possibly queer that might occur in that multidirectional and complex desire—a 
complexity that becomes evident to the viewer in the sexual encounter that reveals Alex anally penetrating 
Álvaro. Thus, Ramiro’s desire for healing or restoring a body to its supposed coherency of biological sex 
(or his “fixing” of “deformities”) reveals that he believes himself to be acting in the best interest—eliding 
the space between normative and surgical coercion—of his patients (or, in Alex’s case, potential patient).
As I have mentioned, Ramiro sees his work as the healing of the sick, as an act of mercy that allows a 
body to persist more operably within the norms that make life livable. Where Ramiro does not evidence 
any consideration of the possibility of a life of flourishing and operability in the social world outside of 
the prospect of “fixing,” Kraken—while still caught in a tormented anxiety in regard to the social world 
that poses a real threat to Alex—makes room for both imagining the possibility of a life of flourishing and 
for understanding protection and safety in alternative ways. Ramiro does not question the language of 
protection as singularly indicative of shielding the child from social hostility and violence; Kraken, however, 
comes to interrogate protection, even while he experiences anguish over Alex’s “condition.” Early in the 
film, Kraken and Alex discuss the recent revelation to Vando, and Alex asks hir father, “If I’m so special, 
why can’t I talk about it?” While Kraken and Suli opted against normativizing surgeries when Alex was an 
infant, numerous references in the film suggest that other measures have been taken to protect hir from the 
social world. Not only has Alex not been permitted to “talk about it,” but the family repeatedly asserts that 
they moved from Buenos Aires to a remote part of Uruguay in order to avoid the possibility of increased 
confrontations within a more populated and urban region. While the circumstances suggest that Kraken 
and Suli have repressed or hidden Alex’s body, this assumption makes a turn when Kraken articulates that 
these measures have been taken merely to protect Alex until an age (which, for Alex, seems to be fifteen) 
that permits hir to make a decision for hirself about hir body.      
In one of the last scenes of XXY, Kraken and Alex discuss choice as it pertains to two separate, but 
related, circumstances. Kraken asks Alex whether or not ze would like him to go to the police in order 
to report hir attackers. Preceding the conversation, viewers watch Kraken pull up to the police station, 
sit in his car, and decide to leave. Because of his reaction, and the conversation with Alex that follows, 
it is implicit that Kraken feels this is a decision Alex, and not he, should make, since, as he tells Alex in 
this scene, “everybody’ll find out.” Alex replies to this concern by saying, “Let them.” In the course of this 
conversation, Kraken—before asking about the police—also tells Alex that he is “looking after [her] until 
[she] can choose.” “What?”  Alex asks. “Whatever you want,” he responds. “What if there isn’t a decision 
to make?” Alex replies, and hir father simply nods. Kraken can be seen in opposition to the parental figure 
of Ramiro, who consistently appears as domineering, attempting to pressure his son into a credible and 
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sanctioned version of masculinity. Kraken, on the other hand, allows his child to take shape; rather than 
forcing hir into the binarized and clean-cut delineations between male and female, he allows hir to choose, 
even if this means ambiguity. And in Alex’s determination not to make a decision—which, of course, is 
very much a decision—and in hir decision to let “them” (the community) “find out” (about hir “condition”), 
Alex provides a representation of a different way of living, a possibility of flourishing. As Ahmed suggests, 
“Inhabiting a body that is not extended by the skin of the social means the world acquires a new shape and 
makes new impressions” (Ahmed 2006, 20). Alex’s attackers evidence the lack of extended social skin to 
provide a habitable space, yet Alex’s world acquires a new shape in both hir decision to “let them” know and 
hir decision to “not decide.”
Importantly, in one scene during which Kraken tries to sort through his own complicated emotions, 
he seeks out Juan (Guillermo Angelelli)—a local man who underwent normalizing surgery as an infant 
himself—in order to ask his advice and opinion about Alex’s situation. Kraken questions his and Suli’s 
decision against surgical intervention when Alex was young: “What if I got it all wrong?” Juan responds, “By 
letting her choose?” Juan proceeds to present Kraken with an alternative narrative about what protection 
means to him, as an adult who was operated on as a child. He reveals to Kraken: “Do you know what my 
earliest memories are?  Medical examinations. I thought I was so horrible when I was born that I had to 
have five operations before my first birthday. That’s what they call ‘normalization.’ It’s not surgery. It’s 
castration. Making her afraid of her own body is the worst thing you can do to your child.” Fortunately, 
Kraken finds validation for his narrative of protection in an adult who refuses the idea that his early 
surgeries “normalized” or protected him. His assertion that it is not surgery but castration indicates that 
Juan’s perspective on the surgery is that it was harmful, not protective. Likewise, the nonfictional stories 
of parents and children involved in early surgeries have later voiced their own reinterpretations of the 
term “protection.” Although it is productive that fictional narratives such as XXY promote complicated, 
contradictory, and alternative understandings of protection, it is of utmost importance that we seriously 
consider the accounts of those who have actually lived with and in the challenges presented by anomalous 
bodies.
“Raped”: Parents, Children, and Their Challenges to “Protection”
Again, although XXY presents an alternative fictional narrative about the parental place in making 
surgical decisions on infants born intersexed—and that fiction is promising for imagining other ways of 
understanding “protection”—the narratives of those parents and children who have been involved in early 
surgical decisions on atypical genitalia are essential to complicating and critiquing notions of protection. 
The emergence of the ISNA (Intersex Society of North America) and other intersex activist and support 
groups, over the course of the 1990s and into the present, has produced one of the centers of dispute and 
recognition in challenging the typical response of immediate surgical intervention in infants. These groups 
have functioned as among the most vocal and influential forces in contesting the concept that surgical 
intervention works as a mechanism of “protection” rather than harm, as many adults have come forward 
in anger, frustration, and resistance regarding the surgeries imposed upon them as infants. In addition, 
some parents have also come to regret the decision they made in the past about their children’s bodies 
and lives. This is not only, though, about a lack of consent or an inability to participate in the decision-
making process. Children often not only undergo multiple surgeries as an infant but also continue to have 
surgeries throughout their entire childhood, making them feel ashamed, ostracized, or humiliated rather 
than protected.9 Additionally, children often feel dehumanized and violated, as the genital region becomes 
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the constant “object” of medical scrutiny and doctors’ gazes.10 Further, early normalizing surgeries often 
leave lasting and devastating effects on the person who undergoes surgery. Most times, infants who were 
born with the ability to reproduce, and who undergo surgery, are left without that capacity intact. Likewise, 
infants often lose any physical sensation in the genital area that might produce sexual pleasure.11 
Ellen K. Feder introduces a number of parents’ stories in her essay, “In Their Best Interests: Parents’ 
Experience of Atypical Genitalia.” She relays the story of Ruby, who had two daughters born with CAH 
(Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia). Although Ruby’s first child had medical complications that put her 
health at risk, which resulted in surgical intervention for her child, the second daughter faced no explicit 
physiological risk; yet, Ruby chose to go forward with normalizing surgery for her second child as well. 
Ruby, like many other parents, has come to regret her decision in retrospect: “My younger daughter is angry 
with me as an adult. She felt that she was raped, medically raped. And she’s right” (Feder 2006, 194). The 
accusation made by Ruby’s daughter—and affirmed by Ruby herself—is a claim that the surgery was not 
protection, but rather an extreme form of violation and coercion. As Feder suggests, “The tragic paradox 
of Ruby’s situation is precisely this: her caring and concerned attempts to fulfill her responsibility to her 
daughters’ well-being led her to consent to actions that resulted in harm to her daughters” (197). Feder 
points, then, to the contradiction—the paradox—that efforts to protect may cause harm. Through Ruby’s 
story, we might gain an insight into the very complex nature of the term “protection.” While this, again, 
does not disavow the potency of hostile social environments from which a parent might seek to protect their 
child, it does present us with an alternative story about protection—one that challenges us to reconsider 
the prospect of coercion or violation that may be masked by narratives suggesting that life with atypical 
genitalia or physical anomalies (or even physical impairments) must be unavoidably tragic and that, to 
avoid the unavoidable, one must “rescue” the child through surgical intervention.
Likewise, Katrina Karkazis, writing about interviews she has conducted with patients, families, and 
doctors involved in intersex births, describes two parents she interviewed about the choice they made for 
surgical intervention:
Ramona Diaz whose daughter has PAIS [Partial Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome] and who wishes she had not 
chosen genital surgery for her daughter has found another way to deal with her disappointment and sadness: 
she has become an advocate for delaying surgery until the child is old enough to decide: “I feel very bad. I hurt 
because she hurts. I just want to spare people everything that she’s been through. I feel the same way that a lot 
of intersexed people do now: Let that person make the decision when they are ready. If they are ever ready to 
say, ‘Yes, I want to do this,’ or, ‘No, I don’t want to do this.’ Let them have the say in the matter. Not the medical 
profession. Not the parents.” And for Rebecca Davis, whose two daughters have CAH, the stresses associated 
with their reaching puberty resulted in a broken marriage. A psychiatrist explained to her that having a chronic 
illness in a family creates an enormous amount of pressure, but she says, “I didn’t have a great marriage to start 
with, but even those with really good marriages, most of them didn’t make it.” She is still struggling to cope with 
the anger of one of her daughters: “I can’t make it right. Part of what she’s so upset about is that she feels raped, 
and in a way she really was, and I couldn’t help it. She can’t see that I couldn’t help it, all she can see is that I let 
it happen and ask, why didn’t I protect her? Oh, God, that hurts.” (Karkazis 2008, 209-10)
Both of these parents advocate delaying surgery until a decision can be made by or with the child, 
allowing the prospective surgical patient to have a say in a choice that has ultimately irreversible effects on 
their own body and life. Although parents may be less familiar with the “condition” of intersex, and may 
also be alienated by the overt jargon utilized in describing both the “condition” and the possible routes 
of “solution,” they nonetheless often believe that (as previously mentioned) they are making a choice to 
Journal of Feminist Scholarship, Vol. 2 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 9
50 Journal of Feminist Scholarship 2 (Spring 2012)
surgically intervene in order to “protect” the child. Parent Rebecca Davis, whose response Karkazis notes 
above, thus issues a poignant challenge to those beliefs. Davis, who regrets her decision to let surgeons 
intervene in her infant child’s body, seems most pained by the use of that very term: protect. Her daughter’s 
question—why didn’t you protect me?—forces Davis to confront the oppositional understanding that the 
once-infant expresses in regard to the decision made for, and on, her body. Protection, according to her 
daughter, would have been to protect her body from surgical intervention, and from the “rape” of her body 
and her will that took place when she was an infant. Davis, who implies that she believed her decision was 
made in order to do precisely that (protect her), must confront the voice of her daughter that speaks back 
and argues for a new understanding of what “protection” really means through issuing a question: Why 
didn’t you protect me? In addition, then, to the proliferation of other fictional narratives of protection, 
the voices of those most intimately affected by intersex surgeries must also be heard, so that practitioners, 
families, and parents might consider the contradictory and complicated claims to protection evoked in the 
name of the child.
Protecting the Norm: The “Menace” of Difference
In addition to the challenges presented in these alternative notions of protection, we might consider the 
possibility that the norm itself is also (although never explicitly) being protected in decisions made to 
perform appearance-normalizing surgeries on infants. Earlier in this essay, I discussed the controversies 
over the case of “Baby Bollinger” in the early twentieth century, when Dr. Haiselden, the baby’s doctor, 
advised parents that the infant (among other infants) should be allowed to “let die.” Martin Pernick goes 
on to discuss Haiselden’s autobiography, which reveals an underlying fear of the threat that anomaly or 
ambiguity pose to norms themselves.12 Of Haiselden, Pernick writes: “In a particularly striking passage in 
his autobiography, he recalled that he first became aware of the retarded when, at the age of eight, he joined 
the gang of boys who regularly assaulted ‘Crazy Mary,’ the village idiot….  Even a child [Haiselden wrote] 
‘instinctively sees the menace in these wretched beings and adopts this means of fighting against it’” (Pernick 
1996, 97). Thus the beatings that Pernick suggests were part of Haiselden’s regimen of “defense” against 
“Crazy Mary,” are justified, in his rhetorical construction, in the name of “fighting against” a “menace” that 
poses a threat.
Judith Butler asks us to consider what provokes violence toward intersexed or transgendered individuals, 
and her question resonates with the argument constructed by Haiselden—in mentioning both the “menace” 
that might be posed and the violent response that proceeds in the name of “protection”: “The violent 
response is the one that does not ask, and does not seek to know. It wants to shore up what it knows, to 
expunge what threatens it with not-knowing, what forces it to reconsider the presuppositions of its world, 
their contingency, their malleability” (Butler 2004, 34-35).
Thus, what is being protected when infants are surgically altered to look “normal” might also be the 
norm itself, and the appearance of that norm as both natural and immobile. Perhaps this may help us 
to understand what “menace” Dr. Haiselden records feeling in response to difference. In “the violent 
response,” division between self and other is enforced in the name of protecting the body of the self from the 
menacing infringement of “the other.” But what threat, precisely, does “Crazy Mary” pose? The “menace” 
of this body resides in its potential to remind one that all bodies—individual, as well as the “body” of norms 
themselves—are ever-fluctuating and incoherent. Surgical interventions that are meant to make one’s body 
look more “normal” also continue repeating, reiterating a binary of biological sex that keeps the binary of 
biology “safe” from infringement—safe from variation and ambiguity. What is in jeopardy with the presence 
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of bodies considered “ambiguous” or “shapeless”—“lumps of flesh,” as Helen Keller called them—is that 
they threaten to suggest the ambiguity of all embodiments, their tenuousness, their intershapings, their 
collapsible edges. The work of Margrit Shildrick, in the context of critical disability theory, suggests that, 
“In failing to reproduce the ideal image of corporeal invulnerability, disabled bodies are not positioned 
as disempowered; on the contrary, they signal threat and danger insofar as they undermine any belief in 
the stability and consistency of bodies in general” (Shildrik 2009, 20). Using the work of Julia Kristeva, 
Shildrick argues that anything which disturbs our notion of whole, integrated, invulnerable bodies forces 
us to question our own sense of self as invulnerable. Likewise, it calls into question the equally holistic 
dominant notion of biological sex as definable and dividable, neatly and clearly bordered. 
When surgeries are performed to alleviate ambiguity, there is an effort made to visually distinguish (to 
create a distinction between “one” and “the other”) and to visually extinguish the evidence of that ambiguity. 
I would argue that often, in the rhetorical creation of a tragic body in need of saving, notions of protection 
can erase the work involved in extinguishing in order to distinguish. This labor is continually exercised 
in the name of maintaining “coherent” sexes and norms. In order to give form to a mass of pluralities, 
infants born intersexed are, much more often than not, surgically altered to fit the format of the norm.13 The 
incoherence of both embodiment and norms themselves is effaced, through labor, to produce “smooth,” 
distinguishable surfaces.
Because of the “power and danger” held in margins, there is a threat to the readability and dominance 
of norms themselves posed by ambiguity and anomaly (Douglas [1966] 2002, 117, 150).  Ellen K. Feder 
suggests that there is a “grave threat that the revelation of intersex poses to the existing social order” (Feder 
2006, 206). If parents, Feder argues, “were to work to identify with their children as intersexed individuals, 
if doctors were to use their considerable authority to promote acceptance of genital variation instead of 
erasure, the prevailing habitus would undergo genuine transformation. Not only would such a positive 
identification lead to improved relationships between parents and children, it would also work against the 
conservative principles of habitus to effect social change” (206). The “habitus” in which we currently exist 
promotes the medical and parental response of immediate surgical intervention when a body does not 
appear “normal.” The socio-medical response, Feder suggests, is to erase signs of human variation in favor 
of clearly legible lines between male and female. According to Feder, “habitus” is a term that describes the 
unquestioned “normative order” that implicitly and redundantly regulates, “conformity with a prevailing 
social order” (191). Feder argues that a parental willingness to identify with a child—and his or her 
potential (future) concerns, desires, physical and sexual sensations—along with the willingness of medical 
practitioners to reconsider their own response might open an entirely transformative understanding of 
difference and the human body, which would fundamentally alter the social landscape of our existence. 
If we acknowledge variation as a norm of human existence, we might also be forced to reconsider the 
constructed nature of so many binary oppositions that shape who we are, who we can be, and how we 
understand—and respond to—physical difference.
Notes
1. By “appearance-normalizing,” I mean that the surgeries that will be the focus of this essay are those that are meant 
to make one appear more “normal.” In the introduction to Surgically Shaping Children, Erik Parens differentiates 
between surgeries meant to improve physiological functioning and those meant to improve psychosocial functioning. 
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Parens describes the story of LilyClaire, the daughter of Lisa Abelow Hedley who relays a narrative in the chapter titled 
“The Seduction of the Surgical Fix” in Parens’s collection. LilyClaire is a seven-year-old with achondroplasia (a form 
of dwarfism) whose mother contemplates whether or not to have her daughter’s legs lengthened during a medical pro-
cedure to fix the bowing of her legs. Here Parens describes the difference between fixing the bowing and lengthening 
LilyClaire’s legs: “The goal of preventing cartilage degeneration is straightforwardly medical; it aims to promote what 
we might call physiological functioning. The goal of adding height, on the other hand, is primarily psychosocial. Of 
course, for anyone who rejects dualist conceptions of the relationship between the physical and the psychical (the body 
and the mind), the distinction between the physiological and the psychosocial aims is fuzzy. Improved physiological 
functioning usually has positive psychosocial effects, and improved psychosocial functioning can have positive physi-
ological effects” (2006, xix). Thus, my essay focuses on those surgeries performed for explicitly psychosocial purposes.
2. See Stryker and Sullivan 2009 and Loeb 2008. Loeb states that her “readings of ‘bodily integrity’ find fantasizing 
a fully agentive, masculated, triumphant subject that acts out onto the world, inviolable and unviolated by feminized 
or queered forms of penetration” (2008, 50) and that it is not possible to “separate our lived ideas of what constitutes 
a ‘whole’ body of a ‘normal’ man from our lived experience of patriarchy, white supremacy, violent colonialism, and 
capitalist exploitation” (55).
3. I do not want to conflate atypical genitalia, physical impairment, and physical anomaly. However, the three do 
come together in the way in which they are predominantly understood to be tragic.  
4. One might argue that to “let die” would be the equivalent of “letting be”—that is, to let the baby die without medi-
cal intervention is no different than the “letting be” of an infant whose genitalia are “ambiguous.” However, we might 
consider the difference between Haiselden’s “letting be” and the “letting be” of an infant born intersexed. Haiselden’s 
“letting be” is the denial of medical intervention on a body that might otherwise survive. The “letting be” of an infant 
born intersexed would not equate, because in most instances (and these are the instances under discussion in this es-
say), infants receive surgical intervention not because of a physiological need to survive, but for the purposes of normal-
izing appearance. Thus, the situations are not parallel.
5. Elizabeth Loeb’s observation, quoted in note 2, is again pertinent here.
6. The film, directed by Lucía Puenzo, is based on the short story titled “Cinismo” by Argentine writer Sergio Bizzo.
7. I have chosen to use gender-neutral pronouns for Alex because, although some others in the film may view hir as 
a young woman, Alex hirself does not necessarily identify as either or solely male or female. 
8. All quotations from XXY are derived from the English subtitles of the film, which is spoken in Spanish.  
9. Katrina Karkazis’s Fixing Sex (2008) is a great resource for information regarding this issue.
10. Again, see Karkazis. Also, the 2002 novel Middlesex by Jeffrey Eugenides gives readers a very rich (though fic-
tional) account of a child with atypical genitalia who is repeatedly dehumanized and treated as a medical specimen by 
doctors: “I lay back. Without having to be told, I lifted my legs and fit my heels in the gynecological stirrups. The room 
had gone ominously silent. The three doctors came forward, staring down. Their heads formed a trinity above me. Luce 
pulled the curtain across the table. They bent over me, studying my parts, while Luce led a guided tour. I didn’t know 
what most of the words meant but after the third or fourth time I could recite the list by heart. ‘Muscular habitus… no 
gynecomastia… hypospadias… urogenital sinus… blind vaginal pouch…’ These were my claim to fame. I didn’t feel fa-
mous, however. In fact, behind the curtain, I no longer felt as if I were in the room” (2002, 420).  
11. Again, see Karkazis 2008.
12. See Grosz 1996 for a further discussion about the “intolerability” of identities that are in between or challenge our 
notions of selfhood, individuation, and categorization.
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13. As Elizabeth Loeb notes, “the medical and legal assignation of sex according only to the binary options of ‘male’ 
and ‘female’ constitutes something of an accident for each of us, an assignation of status that belies and homogenizes 
our unique physicalities into enforced norms”  (2008, 46). 
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